“Nous devons aller chercher des alliés dans des sphères inhabituelles, prêter attention aux petits surgissements, comme la pousse des matsutakes dans des lieux sinistrés, à ces irruptions qui sont peut-être plus politiques qu’on est habitués à le penser. C’est ce que j’appelle les «communs latents» : des alliances temporaires mobilisées dans une cause commune. Fabriquer des mondes n’est pas réservé aux humains et les histoires des différentes espèces se sont toujours entremêlées.”
a thousand minor gestures
“La Borde was not only a petrification, but also an immersion in a kind of chaosmosis, the mix of chaos and complexity, of dissolution, where what is to come must be engendered. (Pelbart 1994: 10; my translations throughout)"
Manning, Erin. The Minor Gesture (Thought in the Act) p. 141. Duke University Press.
'relation is the binding agent of the not-yet'
Woodcuts, Bryan Nash Gill
'C’est depuis l’aube des temps que dans tous les collectifs on soigne les désordres de composition des mondes. Le nôtre n’est pas le moins étrange. S’il est tout à fait légitime d’y ajouter les prises permises par les laboratoires, il est bien superflu de leur octroyer d’avance et sans combattre le pouvoir de définir de quoi le monde est fait.'
Bruno Latour, 2011
And yet the minor gesture is everywhere, all the time. Despite its precarity, it resurfaces punctually, claming not space as such, but space-of-variation. The minor invents new forms of existence, and in them, with them, we come to be.
Erin Manning, The minor gesture
"(...) she is being 'understood' in the deepest sense. Her state directly influences his ; she is 'feeling felt' by another person. This attunement of states forms the nonverbal basis of collaborative, contingent communication. (...) In these transactions, the brain of one person and that of an other are influencing each other in a form of 'co-regulation'. (...) As two individual's states are brought into alignment, a form of what we can call 'mental state resonance' can occur, in which each person's state both influences and is influenced by that of the other. There are moments in which people also need to be alone and not in alignment; an attuned other knows when to 'back off' and stop the alignment process. Intimate relationships involve this circular dance of attuned communication, in which there are alternating moments of engaged alignment and distanced autonomy. At the root of such attunement is the capacity to read the signals (often nonverbal) that indicate the need for engagement or disengagement. (...) Within adult relationships of all sorts, words can come to dominate the form of information being shared, and this can lead to a different form of representational resonance. Such a verbal exchange may feel quite empty if it is devoid of the more primary aspects of each person's internal states. Infant attachment studies remind us of the crucial importance of nonverbal communication in all forms of human relationships."
“ When you
will we know what to do?"
"So it is not so much of knowing a world as such and such, but more of what moves with you, what world you carry with you? When Wekker speaks of a world that the other, the white man, does not know, could she in a way be speaking of what can be felt when crossing particular thresholds?
- Yes, and what the moving takes for granted or what it carries with it. When I talk about neurotypicality I mean the systemic ease of crossing the threshold. This is what neurotypicality carries: a claim on the world. Neurotypicality in my work never refers to a person. Neurotypicality is the practising of an ease based on norms that underlie the valuation of existence. Neurotypicality claims space in very precise ways. It claims bodyings too. It moves without a stim. It speaks without an accent. It enters without a stir. It does these things not because there is actually a baseline human that fits into its category, but because it has trained us (those of us who pass) to create and recreate that baseline, and we are practised at inhabiting it – those of us who have access to its parameters. When Fred Moten says that black life is always neurodiverse life, this is what I understand : that blackness has never had access to this baseline. When Sylvia Wynter speaks of black life as excluded from the category of the human, this is also what I understand, that the human is the figure par excellence of neurotypicality, which is to say, Whiteness. Whiteness is not simply an epidermal configuration. Whiteness is the privilege not to have had to take the baseline into consideration. It is the privilege not to have had to think about how to pass. Whiteness is never to have had to make an effort at appearing in the know. Whiteness is crossing and re-crossing without ever noticing the threshold in the first place. Whiteness is the effortlessness of finding your place in existence. Whiteness is the assumption that the world is yours to inhabit and yours to define."
Interview intégrale d'Erin Manning ici : https://onlineopen.org/how-the-minor-moves-us-across-thresholds-socialities-and-techniques
"I think it is clear that by 'understanding' I do not mean a purely intellectual process. For understanding one might say love. But no word has been more prostituted. What is necessary, though not enough, is a capacity to know how ( ) is experiencing himself and the world, including oneself. If one cannot understand him, one is hardly in a position to begin to 'love' him in any effective way."
Ronald D. Laing, The Divided Self
"As there is no entity, no identity to queer, rather queerness coming forth at us from all directions, screaming its defiance, suggests to me a move from intersectionality to assemblage. The Deleuzian assemblage, as a series of dispersed but mutually implicated networks, draws together enunciation and dissolution, causality and effect. As opposed to an intersectional model of identity, which presumes components—race, class, gender, sexuality, nation, age, religion—are separable analytics and can be thus disassembled, an assemblage is more attuned to interwoven forces that merge and dissipate time, space, and body against linearity, coherency, and permanency. Intersectionality demands the knowing, naming, and thus stabilizing of identity across space and time, generating narratives of progress that deny the fictive and performative of identification: you become an identity, yes, but also timelessness works to consolidate the fiction of a seamless stable identity in every space. As a tool of diversity management, and a mantra of liberal multiculturalism, intersectionality colludes with the disciplinary apparatus of the state—census, demography, racial profiling, surveillance—in that “difference” is encased within a structural container that simply wishes the messiness of identity into a formulaic grid. Displacing queerness as an identity or modality that is visibly, audibly, legibly, or tangibly evident, assemblages allow us to attune to intensities, emotions, energies, affectivities, textures as they inhabit events, spatiality, and corporealities. Intersectionality privileges naming, visuality, epistemology, representation, and meaning, while assemblage underscores feeling, tactility, ontology, affect, and information."
Jasbir Puar, Queer times, queer assemblages
"you see, in old african cognitive worlds, human beings where never satisfied of simply being human beings ; they were constantly in search of a supplement to there humanhood ; often to there humanhood, they added attributes of animals, properties of plants, and various animate and inanimate objects, in a compositional gesture that had nothing to do with the current politics of identity, understood as essence ; personhood was therefore not a matter of ontology ; it was always a matter of composition and of assemblage of a multiplicity of vital beings : plants, animals, natural elements being part of these vital beings ; to convert one specific object into something else, and to capture the force inherent in any single matter and being, constituted the ultimate form of power and agency.
"so the argument making is that neoliberalism has created the conditions for renewed convergence in a time's fusion between the living human being and the objects, artefacts, or the technologies which supplement or augment us ; this event, which I am equating to a return to animism, is nevertheless not without danger for the idea of emancipation in this age of crypto fascism.
if we accept that, in fact, the human is ... only exist in so far as ... the human is ... becoming, involved in a process of becoming - a process of becoming which is compositional ; you augment yourself by partaking, liberally, of that which surrounds you ; the vegetal world, the organic world, the mineral world, the world of animals, you are entangled with those vital beings that are also part of this cosmic environment ; what does it do to the believe for instance that a human being is not a thing ; what does it do to theories of alienation and reification ; how does it force us to rethink all of those kee elements which have allowed us to articulate some idea of freedom, in these times, now
... the project was not to tell you were to go, the project was to open it and ... leave you with that mess.”
" I would insist that the notion of ethics makes sense only in relation to subjects - understood not in a humanist sense but, instead, as encompassing all that is capable of experience and, therefore, of suffering. It is the possibility of their suffering that makes us responsible to sentient beings in particular. It is this possibility that makes it wrong to relate to subjects in the stated sense as if they were objects. By contrast, to feel responsible or accountable to what can be affected ontologically but not experientially - for instance, when being destroyed - seems to me to involve a projection of the said feature of subjectivity onto objects, understood along these lines as what does not care, even about 'its own' becoming or unbecoming.
" as I read him Bhaskar ( ) sees intra-action as one kind of interplay between phenomena. Sometimes, when the interplay has little internal impact on the phenomena in interplay, the term ‘inter-act’ might be more adequate. This multifaceted view of how things relate to one another is one of the strengths of the dialectical critical realist ontology, which could be drawn on in intersectional analysis.
Seeing boundedness and boundlessness as two interdependent aspects of the tissue of being works as a remedy against tendencies to get stuck in debates about whether gender, race, class, etc. are separate or not. Bearing in mind that there are many modes as well as degrees of connection and distinction, we can put our energy into more precise theorizations of how different power processes work for and against each other in different spatio-temporal locations and for different subjects. What, in various geohistorical locations and on different levels of abstraction, is the precise inter- or intraactive relation between structures like male dominance, heteronormativity, racism and capitalism? To what extent are they independent from one another and to what extent co-constitutive and intra-active, in the past and in the present? Do they support or contradict one another, or both? "
Objects are thus defined as what the subject 'is not', i.e. does not wish to be. Inferiorising passivity seems to hark back to a discursive logic whereby to be active rather than passive - that is, to polarise both attributes against one another whilst equating one term with 'self' and negating its counterpart - is to assign superior value to a 'subject' on grounds of his self-imputed strength or power to act, in binary opposition to what is exposed to the actions of others. Passivity here seems to be coded in terms of weakness and vulnerability - an exposure, ultimately, to other's power or agency. The widespread association of patriarchy, racism and others (intersecting) systems of domination with an objectification of subjects would seem to make sense in terms of this discursive logic, that is, in terms of the idea that to be a subject is to be worth more than an object because one is capable of activity or 'has agency' (which endowment these systems of domination disavow in their respective Others).
In order to undo the subject/object duality, thus understood, it is necessary to take account on subject's exposure to what they cannot control, and hence, of the capacity for experience which is constitutive of the vulnerability that comes with being a subject. This is irrespective of whether this category is taken to have an empirical counterpart, that is, of whether any such thing as a pure 'object', devoid of experience, actually exists. It is only on account of an empathy with what might possibly suffer that ethical concern makes sense. "
Je vais explorer avec vous cette situation, en partant d'un minuscule domaine des sciences sociales que j'appelle l'anthropologie symétrique et qui a pour but d'établir avec les autres collectifs des rapports qui ne soient fondés ni sur la notion de cultures, ni sur celle de nature.
Depuis une trentaine d'années, cette anthropologie s'efforce d'éviter d'utiliser le schème Nature/Culture qui a fait beaucoup de ravages en anthropologie et que vous connaissez bien dans votre propre domaine dans la version qui n'est pas moins ravageuse et qui porte le nom de « Mind/Body ». J'utiliserai cette expression en anglais tout au long pour bien marquer qu'il ne s'agit pas là d'une évidence naturelle mais d'une production anthropologique locale et historiquement située qu'il n'y a aucune nécessité de prendre pour argent comptant. Nature/Culture aussi bien que Mind/Body sont deux façons de bloquer toute réflexion sur ce qui arrive quand les êtres du psychisme rencontrent les effets des cures.
Deux ensembles de travaux en rapport avec l’anthropologie permettent de tourner quelque peu ces deux obstacles. La première est bien sûr l'ethnopsychiatrie que vous connaissez sûrement par les travaux pionniers de Georges Devereux, lequel a introduit une faille qui a été élargie par Tobie Nathan avec l'efficacité que vous saveziv. J’ai eu la chance de suivre quelque temps d'assez près sa consultationv. Grâce à cette faille, à mon sens essentielle pour toute philosophie de la psychiatrie, s'établit avec les autres pratiques des autres collectifs des rapports un peu plus égauxvi. On ne cherche plus, avec quelque condescendance, à voir dans les autres techniques de cure la version voilée de la psychiatrie occidentale, mais on se met à comparer des procédures distinctes pour entrer en relation avec des situations qui n'ont pas forcément le psychisme pour seul ingrédient. Cette relation plus égale se caractérise par trois traits : le respect pour la psychiatrie comme pratique ; la reconnaissance des thérapeutes dits traditionnels en tant que « collègues » possédant d’autres diplômes et d’autres qualifications ; et, enfin, l’ouverture à la possibilité de reconnaître dans la cure le rôle d’êtres extérieurs au sujet autonome. Tout ce travail commun ne peut plus être simplement reconnu comme l’opposition entre psychiatrie rationnelle et charlatanisme irrationnel —l’extension de l’industrie pharmaceutique interdisant de toute façons de considérer la psychiatrie occidentale comme étant « enfin rationnelle » !
Le deuxième ensemble de travaux vient de « l’anthropologie de la nature », l’expression elle-même est capitale, telle que Philippe Descola la mène au Collège de France. En travaillant ce qu’il appelle le « naturalisme », Descola ne parle aucunement du Body mais de l’étrange notion occidentale qui engendre le Mind/Body comme l’un des modes de relation possible que les collectifs (c’est l’expression que nous utilisons tous les deux pour ne pas parler de cultures) entretiennent avec les êtres qui les composent. Je rappelle que le naturalisme est l’une seulement des quatre formes que peuvent prendre ces relations : les trois autres animique, totémique et analogique—, soit ignorent totalement la nature aussi bien que le Mind/Body, soit l’inversent complètement, comme c’est le cas de l’animisme, lequel, au contraire, fait du corps l’élément qui spécifie les âmes humaines dont tous les êtres —arbres ou animaux— sont en fait composésix. Ce qui m’intrigue toujours dans cette situation, c’est que Descola montre, fort tranquillement, que le naturalisme est la plus anthropocentrique des quatre formes de relation, ce qui n’a pas l’air de trop choquer ses collègues biologistes ou physiciens qui ne doivent pas le lire trop attentivement. Ce qui prouve combien peu le schème Nature/Culture a d’emprise sur les pratiques …
extrait de "Désincarcérer les corps ?" Bruno Latour